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The Nationalization of the Dutch Owned Plantations in North Sumatra:
To Whom The Communal Land Belong?
Edy Ikhsan1
Abstract
This article has been developed through an analysis of primary and secondary sources
concerning the nationalization’s policy of the Dutch enterprises in Indonesia as had been
conducted by Soekarno’s regime back in 1958. The impact of this said policy has been so
much felt very strongly to these days, most especially on the ex-concessionary lands of the
Dutch enterprises in North Sumatera. The flaws made by the Indonesian government in
interpreting the terminology of Concession to the Cultivation Rights on Lands, in the said
nationalization policy, have created various endless conflicts among central and regional
governments, state-owned enterprises, the Sultanates (mainly the Deli and the Serdang),
private-owned companies, the military and other interest groups. At certain ends, these
critical disputes have left some saddening and murky situations whereas the ancestral lands
belonging to Melayu people, which were put in concession by the Sultanate to the Dutchowned enterprises, were gradually missing in terms of identity and without any compensation
to this ethnic group.
Keywords: nationalization, concession rights, communal land, deli, east coast of sumatra.

Abstrak
Artikel ini dikembangkan melalui analisis sumber primer dan sekunder terkait kebijakan
nasionalisasi perusahaan-perusahaan Belanda di Indonesia yang dilakukan oleh pemerintahan
Soekarno pada tahun 1958. Dampak dari kebijakan ini masih terasa sampai hari ini, khususnya
di eks tanah-tanah konsesi perusahaan perkebunan Belanda di Sumatera Utara. Kesalahan
pemerintah Indonesia di dalam menafsirkan (mengkonversi) terminologi konsesi menjadi hak
guna usaha dalam kebijakan nasionalisasi tersebut menimbulkan konflik yang berkepanjangan
diantara pemerintah (daerah dan pusat), perkebunan negara, Institusi Kesultanan (khususnya
Deli dan Serdang), perusahaan swasta, TNI dan kelompok-kelompok kepentingan lainnya.
Ujung dari kemelut ini menyisakan keadaan menyedihkan dimana tanah-tanah adat orang
Melayu yang dahulunya dikonsesikan oleh Kesultanan kepada Perusahaan Belanda, berangsurangsur hilang tanpa memberikan kompensasi apapun terhadap kelompok etnis ini.
Kata Kunci: nasionalisasi, hak-hak konsesi, tanah komunal, deli, sumatera timur.

I. Introduction
The Nationalization of Dutch owned plantation in 1958 was of a national, Indonesian
political move. Such a move was obviously taken under the pressing circumstances of
internal, unstable and political turbulence during which such a tension with the Dutch
government was occurring at its climax. “Based on the moral strength of nationalism and
guided by a government under the more or less direct personal blessing of Presiden
Soekarno as the real element of political power, the nationalization turned out to be a
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political victory in the contest with the Dutch victory. Furthermore it made an effective
groundwork for the start of implementation of the concept of guided economy”2
Criticism, protest and opposition against the nationalization had not sparked only
from within the home but also from out of country. From within the home countries, such a
move was seen as a political maneuver of Soekarno’s government emerging from the state of
helplessness with regard to improving the economy of Indonesia. Whilst, from out of country,
primarily from the Dutch Government and its entrepreneurs, they had bluntly staged protests
accusing the nationalization held by the Soekarno’s government as had been apparently
falling by the way side of legal procedures, more predominantly inconsistent with the
principles of international laws. Some numbers of countries supported the Dutch government
for the protest. Somehow, over the all legal processes to be taken, the Dutch’s claims had
come to no result. “Politically the prospect of nationalization might be said to be real
contribution to stabilization.”3
One of the most paramount reasons of the nationalization was part of a struggle to
free the Western Irian to be off the Dutch’s reign. With the 7 (seven) articles delineated
within the Law on the Nationalization of the Dutch Plantation (the shortest law), to be
officially adopted on 31st December 1958, and was implemented relatively as of 3rd
December 1957, that the said law was engineered to free this vast nation from the foreign
economic domination. In a later stance of the ruling government, it was revealed that the
nationalization would eventually stem from two interrelated objectives, namely the state’s
economy as well as of the state’s security. With the first objective, the state would have an
opportunity to improve the people’s economy by expropriating the Dutch’s plantation and
this as well provided the opportunity to consolidate the existing nationwide assets.
Meanwhile, with the second objective, the nationalization was apparently aimed at fostering
the security and defense of the state from outside or foreign intervention.4
The apprehension of the Dutch over the rights to properties owned by its private
enterprises in Indonesia in the post of Indonesia independence was apparently seen very
clearly from how they try to reconstruct the structure of protection toward its Dutch owned
enterprises that was obviously reflected within Linggarjati Accord to be duly signed on 25th
March 1947. Within Article 14 of the said Accord, it was noticeably stipulated: “The
Government of Republic Indonesia acknowledges the rights of non-Indonesia residents that
shall claim their rights that was frozen to be restored and their properties to be returned –
that was under their ownership – de facto. A joint committee shall be made available to
administer such a restoration or compensation.”
However, van de Kerkhof quoted, ideas of the Article 14 was simply an illusion and
could not be plainly undertaken with regard to providing protection over the Dutch owned
enterprises in Indonesia. “The opposition of the Indonesian nasionalists and militant labour
unions, illegal occupations of estate lands (“squatting”) and the unwillingness of Dutch
authorities to withdraw their troops made implementation of article 14 a slow and frustrating
process.” Four months after the Linggarjati Accord duly agreed, the Dutch launched its first
aggression (July 1947) under a codeword “operation product”, with main objective to
safeguard many of its enterprises and potential oil wells in Java and Sumatera. The said
2
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operation succeeded to “liberate” about 1000 areas of plantations and factories, somehow
many of the said enterprises had been entirely defunct and out of order.5
The chaos upon failures in some deliberations between Indonesia and the Dutch,
mainly on respective sovereignty of each country in the area of ex- West Indies, had blatantly
reached its culmination with regard to the matters related to West Irian and failures to
implement the Meja Bundar Accord. By the end of 1957, Soekarno took a stern stance to take
over all Dutch owned enterprises in Indonesia as a form of reciprocal Law toward the
Dutch’s stance over the most eastern part of Indonesia. In later stages, through Law No. 13 of
1956, Indonesia definitely cancelled out its relationship with the Dutch on the pretext of the
Meja Bundar Accord.
Article 7 of Law No.13/1956 clearly stipulated: “(clause 1) The interests of the Dutch
in any territory of the Republic of Indonesia is duly treated based on the prevailing rules and
regulation of Temporary Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and legislations that apply
and shall apply within the territory of Republic of Indonesia. (clause 2) Rights, Concession,
Permits and measures to run the Dutch owned enterprises shall be considered provided that is
not against the interests of the state’s development efforts. (clause 3) Such a treatment as
delineated above may not be justified on any privileges in whatsoever reasons.
In context of North Sumatera, the takeover of the Dutch-owned assets was conducted
through so called a Military Authority Announcement NO. PM/Peng 0010/12/57. The
announcement briefly stated: (1) The struggle of West Irian Liberation comprises of all
Indonesian people’s efforts – under the leadership of the government of Republic of
Indonesia; (2) Efforts in relation to the liberation of West Irian shall be duly conducted
orderly and peacefully … so on; (3) The authority (shifting of authority) over the Dutch
owned enterprises shall be conducted in pursuance to the government’s order or Military
Authority by of exercising measures to be defined as such: (4) Any unsolicited Laws falling
by the way side of the prevailing law shall not make anyone free from further investigation
and legal prosecution; (5) Any unilateral action over the said Dutch owned enterprises by
persons or groups are strictly banned (6) Successively, after the Military Authority
Announcement, then emerged some other regulations, namely: Military Authority
Announcement NO. PM/KPTS-0042/12/57 on The Direct Monitoring of all Dutch owned
Enterprises. Later, Military Authority Announcement NO. PM/KPTS-0045/12/57 on The
Taking Over of all Behher Authority over all Dutch Enterprises, and Military Authority
Regulation NO. PM/PR-006/12/57 on Restriction of Movement of the Dutch People.
Cautions over the taking over of the Dutch owned enterprises was perceptibly
reflected from one of the mandates released by the Commander in Chief of T&T-I Bukit
Barisan which was essentially stating:” The Dutch-owned enterprises that prevail in
Indonesia are generally carrying social function, whereas for the state and the people, they
may contribute significant meaning. Therefore, the state and the people feel the necessity for
the continuation and perfection with regard to the operation of the said enterprises. Despite
the owners of the said enterprises, it is the sole responsibility of the government and for the
whole sake of the people to secure smooth operation of the said enterprises. Any efforts that
imply such a disorder or that of causing disharmonies against the smooth operation shall be
5
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banned by whatsoever means.” More or less one year period after the stern action of the
takeover of the Dutch owned enterprises, then Law No. 86 of 1958 was officially adopted as
already quoted in several paragraphs above.
II. The Law on Nationalization: Criticism and Defense
Article 1 of the Law No. 86 of 1958 was the real core essence of what the state
wanted in context of “political revenge” against the Dutch. The first article stipulated: The
Dutch owned enterprises being located within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia –
those of going to be officially decided under the government’s regulations shall be covered
by the rules of Nationalization and are fully and arbitrarily owned by the government of
Republic of Indonesia”. Explicitly, this law stipulated that Onteigeningsordonantie
(Stb.1920. No.574) on Deprivation of Rights did not apply in this context of nationalization.
This ordinance provided guaranty that no one was never allowed to be snatched from his/her
ownership of wealth without prior being prosecuted before the prevailing justice. In the state
perspectives, this ordinance shall only apply for individual expropriation – whilst this
Nationalization law had its own general character. Other reason emphasized that the
ordinance on the deprivation of right was made under a legal system, which was based on the
supremacy of individual rights. In the mean time, the Nationalization Law was developed
under a legal system, which was emphasized in context of social function of a private
ownership (individual).
The Government Regulation No. 4 of 1959 on the Determination of Agricultural
Enterprises/Tobacco Plantation of the Dutch owned clearly mentioned that there were 38
tobacco plantations to be nationalized, and 22 among them were located on North Sumatera.
In the basic consideration of the Government Regulation it is stated that the Agricultural
Enterprise/tobacco plantations are important branches of production for the people and that
determine the lives of many people. The twenty two tobacco plantations as said are as the
followings:
No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Name of Plantation
Bandar Klippa
Bulu Tjina
Helvetia
Klambir Lima
Kloempang
Kwala Begomit
Kwala Bingei
Mariendal
Medan Estate
Padang Brahrang
Rotterdam AB
Saentis
Sampali
Tandem
Tandem Ilir
Tandjoeng Djati
Timbang Langkat
Batang Kwis

Location
Deli/Serdang District
Deli/Serdang District
Deli/Serdang District
Deli/Serdang District
Deli/Serdang District
Langkat
Langkat
Deli/Serdang District
Deli/Serdang District
Langkat
Deli/Serdang District
Deli/Serdang District
Deli/Serdang District
Deli/Serdang District
Deli/Serdang District
Langkat
Langkat
Deli/serdang` District

Owners
NV Vereningde Deli Mij
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
NV. Sinembah Mij.
Same as above
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19.
20.
21.
22.

Kwala Namoe
Pagar Marbau
Patoembah
Tanjong Morawa

Deli/Serdang District
Deli/Serdang District
Deli/Serdang District
Deli/Serdang District

Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above

The Nationalization Law No. 86 of 1958 was gaining a lot of criticism and challenges
by law. By essence, this Law contains a defect at least in some respects: first, despite as
repeatedly stated in Law No. 86 of 1958 that the act of nationalization is consistent with the
cancellation of relations of Indonesia and the Netherlands based on the Meja Bundar
Conference) with reference to. Law N0. 13 of 1956, but if confronted with article 7 of Law
No. 13 of 1956, which reads: "The interests of the Dutch in the territory of the Republic of
Indonesia are treated according to the rules contained in the Constitution of the Republic of
Indonesia and Legislation that applies or would apply in the territory of the Republic of
Indonesia. Rights, concessions, licenses and how to run the Dutch company would not be
ignored so long as not against the country's development. The Treatment as referred to the
above shall not be based on the privileges for any reason. ", just did not show an attitude of
consistency. In other words, the Article 7 states that it still requires the state to respect the
rights owned by the Dutch companies, despite the note that says not against the country's
development. In other words, event with the Law No. 13 of 1956 alone, the Dutch already lost
the rights/privileges that distinguished them from citizens or of other foreign enterprises – the
same privileges they had got every since.
Second, the act nationalization performed by Indonesian was clearly directed to
campaign for the liberation of West Irian from the Dutch domination. The campaign was
conducted by the ways in which private property are taken by "forced" to be the state-owned.
Indonesia also declined to file a dispute against the Dutch to the attention of an international
court. Such ways are seen as something to be taken partially and with intentions to omit the
private rights of others (in this case the individuals and the Dutch legal entities). In this
context, Indonesia can be categorized as to have done what was so called detournement de
pouvoir (the abuse of power).
Third, the practice of nationalization means a removal of the entire civil rights of the
individual and of the Dutch owned enterprises. This means that all the enterprises had to give
up and let go all the wealth, offices, documents, securities, cash, financial data and all objects
owned by them in Indonesia. All letters and correspondences overtaken then been opened by
Indonesian officials who were appointed, by which action was very contrary to article 17 of
the Provisional Constitution of 1950 and article 234 of the Criminal Code (KUH Pidana). In
short, they lose all rights as the owners as regulated under article 570 of Civil Code (KUH
Perdata).
Fourth, the first Ministerial Decree No. 485/MP/1959 stated that in the event, in the
enterprises there were foreign individuals of non Dutch citizens, then compensations would
firstly be made to any individuals of the non-Dutch citizens. It was quite contrary to article 2
of the Nationalization Law, which was implicitly implying that no discrimination would
apply in context of settling up the compensation. Therefore, the nationalization itself had
been of a violation based on the principle of international law, most specifically related to the
principles of non-discrimination.
Relating to the nationalization, which was discriminatory in nature, Henri Rolin
quoted that the law was clearly illegal on the grounds that it only touched a single class of
5

people and the Dutch legal entity. Mc. Nair and Verdross further emphasized on what Rolin
had mentioned quoting that it was called as discriminatory and illegal because the parameter
of the nationalization was only aimed at a foreign group.6 Decision to conduct the
nationalization, which was regarded discriminatory, was incompatible by the momentum of
peace as regulated within international laws. Besides, the principles of the non-discriminatory
had been adopted by many theorists and international trials or arbitration.7 Even, by the
contents of Meja Bundar Conference, matters related to guaranty was also applied for the
Dutch owned Enterprises domiciled in Indonesia. This was what caused, according to many
international legal experts, the nationalization was incompatible with Indonesia’s obligation
vis a vis with the Netherlands arising from treaties which are still in force.8
A number of juridical arguments elaborated above, in reality, was turned out not
immediately to be able to frame the main opinion on the ways or nationalization measures
used Indonesia at that time. There are a number of argumentation to fight against thought,
opinion and theories used. Firstly, a matter of nationalization is a crucial notion to get away
fully from foreign domination and this is a mutual realization widely owned by the majority
of Indonesian people. It has been of what was so called rechtbewustzijn (Legal Awareness) of
the people of Indonesia. Such an awareness has become not only as the source of legal
philosophy but also as positive law. And, in line with the matter, then the emergence of the
nationalization as a means of formal regulation, which was adopted by the official regime,
can annul other legal products – either be of those in the lower or those of the linear
hierarchies compared to it. Article 570 of the civil law and article 44 of the Trade Law for
instance, by the adoption of Nationalization Law, normatively, lose its binding power. The
doctrine of Lex Posterior derogat Lex Anteriori applies in this context.
Second, in the constitutional approach, the lawsuit said that the Nationalization Law
was illegal and unwarranted. On the contrary, the products of colonial law were the one that
was actually against many aspects of the people’s social justice. This could be demonstrated
through, for instance, Article 570 of the Criminal Code, which gives absolute rights to
individuals to get hold of properties/wealth based on zakelijke rechten. On the contrary, the
Nationalization Law, which was based on Provisional Constitution of 1950 could have refer
to Article 26 verse three (3) which stated that the personal rights was to have social function.
In addition, the Nationalization Law also have made necessary adjustment to the principles of
justice as stipulated in article 27 of the Provisional Constitution of 1950, which stated: “The
expropriation of personal rights for the sake of public interests upon any properties or
unwarranted rights, other otherwise with proper compensation in accordance with rules and
regulation.” In the event that a property be destroyed for the sake of public interests, either
permanently or temporarily, it shall be destroyed completely to the state of unusable, by any
public authority, it shall be done by an accompanying compensation in accordance with the
prevailing rules and regulation, unless otherwise determined by rules differently.” Means of
direct showing to certain articles in this constitution is important to show which was illegal
and legal in this case.
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Third, relating to the alleged discrimination being addressed to the Nationalization
Law, the facts looked nothing like what appeared on the surface. The empirical situation
showed that the Dutch owned enterprises still enjoyed a high economic position compared to
other foreign capital enterprises. The Dutch estimated to remain controlling about 30 – 40
percent of Indonesia’s economy.9 Further, the Nationalization Law could also be applied to
other foreign entrepreneurs other than those of Dutch origins, as it could be seen from its
stipulation,” “wholly or partly Dutch-Owned” in the nationalization law.
Fourth, there was an assumption that said the illegality of the nationalization law lied
on the premature termination of the existing concession contracts. In general
(internationally), it was recognized that a concession contract would cause obligations and
rights that could not be directly interfered or intervened by the state’s law, except that by
referring to rules of the concession contract (lex contractus), unless otherwise it was stated
differently. Unfortunately, such clauses could not be found within the nationalization law and
because of that Indonesia just could be dragged into the international arbitration/tribune. The
last argument from the standpoint of Indonesian Government demonstrated very clearly the
position of the state when the concession contract was drafted. In other words, why such
clauses were not stipulated within the concession contract wholly because Indonesia was not
and certainly not a contracting partners in context of the concession contract, instead that of
the Sultanate and the Foreign Enterprises. This side has not been much reviews of the
scholars that wrote about the Nationalization of the Dutch owned enterprises of 1957/1958.
III. Bremen Case: Aspects of Customary Law Within Foreign Justice
The lawsuit conducted by Vereningde Deli Mij and Senembah Mij against Indonesia
government was triggered by the removal of tobacco auction market from the Netherland
(Amsterdam and Rotterdam) to Germany (Bremen), the establishment of German-Indonesian
Tobacco Trading Company of Bremen and the influx of the first 5000 balles of tobacco to
Bremen Port, the harvest of 1958. The lawsuit was the culmination point after some incidents
in the post of the nationalization, namely: either Deli Mij or Senembah Mij would not
recognize the prevailing agreement against Indonesia’s government in context of tobacco
export on pretext they were not anymore tied to any agreement in the post of the
nationalization. The two enterprises filed lawsuit against The Branch of Indonesian Bank in
Amsterdam and refused to repay all of their debts, which was estimated at around 80.000.000
(eighty million) Gulden (H.Fls, Holland Florijns).
The legal basis of the plaintiffs to promote their lawsuits was that they considered
themselves as the official owner of the disputed tobacco – as they believed that the tobacco
was produced from their plantation areas in Sumatera where they had concession rights of
plantation (landbouwconcessie). Such rights, in view of the plaintiffs, was of rights upon
materials (zakelijken aard) even if other people had planted tobacco on it – the tobacco would
remain of rights (eigendom) of the plaintiffs.10
There were three important lawsuits forwarded by Deli and Sinembah Mij in this
phenomenal case. First, asking the Bremen District Court to declare that 5000 balles of
tobacco to be belonged to the property of Deli and Sinembah Mij. Second, forcing the court
to declare that the Nationalization Law No. 86 of 1958 was against the law and to have no
9
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binding legal power, mainly with regard to extra-territorial context. Third, forcing the court to
impose the implementation of Article 30 of Civil Code of the Germany, namely putting this
case as a serious violation of international law. In this context, they also asked the court to
issue a verdict or intermediate decision that the disputed tobacco be first confiscated and to
declare that the Nationalization Law was not in proper compliances to the International Law.
In the issue related to whom was considered to be the owner of the tobacco, according
to Indonesia Government, there should be made clear first the basis to know which law to be
actually used to tackle the problems regarding the agricultural land concession. The
Indonesia Government had at least used 3 legal basis in the plead forwarded in the Bremen
Court, namely: first, in relation to the matters of agrarian law of inter-groups: “The
agricultural concession land that included an autonomous domain (zelfbestuur) of Deli
Sultanate in context of governance arrangement prevailing when the such rights was made.
The land of the autonomous domain was the land subdued under the customary law.”11
Second, in relation to the application of Customary law: “ If the Customary Law to be used in
conjunction with the yields of the harvest, then the planters and the cultivators were the
parties to be considered as the owners of the yields of the harvest, “Wie zaat die maait”, so
that was one reason that could be maintained in the Customary Law.”12 This legal basis was
suggested by expert in the area of customary Law, Soekanto, a professor at the University of
Indonesia. The plaintiff was rather startled on the reasons of using of this customary law.
They did not expect at all that the customary law would be used as a way of defending. From
the beginning they had used western and European law as a way to defend, articles to be
known within Burgerlijk Wetboek.
Third, the agricultural concession rights was a private rights, in nature: The Dutch
Enterprises argued the rights of plantation concession made between the Sultanate along with
its cronies and the Dutch owned enterprises was the rights of materials (zakelijk rechten) – in
other words to be mentioned as the rights of erfpacth. Therefore, as stipulated in Article 721
of the Civil Code, it was stated that anyone who was so called erfpatcher shall enjoy every
rights contained therein the materials (eingendom) upon the land ( De erfpachter oefent alle
de regten uit, welke aan de eigendom van het erf verknocht zijn). Because of its nature of
rights, then the rights over the yields of the harvest was consequently considered strong and
valid, because it had what was so called a vruchttrekkingsrecht). In response to this,
Indonesia Government denied and pleaded back that such a concession was of a private rights
(persoonlijkrecht), so that was recognized in European legal system.
The judges’ decision in this context had become very interesting – not upon whom to
be won or be found guilty but on the perspectives used, in which various aspects of local
customary laws and of the Dutch private law to become the backbones in the decision making
process. The Judge’s views in Bremen were like the following: First, the Customary Law
recognized that if a person claimed rights of ownership over any agricultural products then
the concerned person had to prove that he or she was the one sowing the seeds and planting
the products. Customary law said: “ He who sows the seed, he harvests “wie zaait, die
maait).” In this context, the plaintiffs could not physically prove of sowing the seeds, sowing
and harvesting the yields/crops due to the nationalization of December 1957. Second, the
western civil law did not recognize any rights of wealth over something that was produced
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from a concession land no longer in direct control of the concession holders in time of the
harvest.
In view of the two perspectives used, the Bremen’s judges further said that all the
concession and the administration of the existing plantation carried out by the New Plantation
Enterprises and the administration of local military was fully representing the interests of the
Republic Indonesia. In addition, the Government of Indonesia was not of the guardian of the
two enterprises filing the lawsuits. Owner of the land, the crops/yields and the administration
of the plantation was the Government of Indonesia. So then if the Government of Indonesia
would then cultivate the land, plant seed and harvest the crops was indeed not to run
obligation on behalf of the plaintiffs, instead it was because of the rights they originally
owned.
In another description, the Bremen Judge quoted that the decision might have been
different if the grant concession proposed by the plaintiffs to have had material rights, in
nature (zakelijke rechten), which of course would not have been lost or expired due to the
loss of the rights of the land tenure. The court after the search through the literature and
Indonesian jurisprudence stated that the concession was persoonlijk rechten. Unfortunately,
the plaintiff did not attempt to apply for change of Persoonlijke Rechten to zakelijke Rechten
shortly after the re-negotiation relating to the management of the plantation in 1951.13
Bremen Court just did not see at all that this case was doubtful, and therefore there
was no need to enforce article 100 of the Germany Civil Code, which actually opened a
possible chance to propose for an appeal to a higher court on pretext of the case having a
doubtful character.14 According to German Judges, both validity and legality of
Nationalization law of 1958 were not of being doubtful anymore provided that all materials
being nationalized were located within the country that was carrying out the nationalization
(Indonesia). In addition the judge argued that article NO. 30 German Civil Code which
stipulated that foreign law can be deferred by German judge, when this usage would
constitute a violation of decency or against the purpose of the German law and could only be
used in cases that meet one element so called inlandsbeziehungen, i.e. something related to
the German domestic affairs, could not be used in this context because these elements were
not met.15
IV. Common Faults of the Nationalization and the Loss of Customary Lands
The use of elements of the customary law in legal defenses of the lawyers representing the
Government of Indonesia in the trial in Bremen as elaborated above, implicitly, indicated a
seizure/recognition of rights by the Indonesian Government over the rights owned by the
autonomous governments and the shadowing legal communities. However, the recognition of
which is also agreed upon by the Bremen judges, showed no correlation in the daily practice
of the people’s life. The Sultanates of Eastern Sumatra along with all of their rights in context
of legal relation with the Dutch owned enterprises was clearly ignored - not even to be the
basis in the discourse around the nationalization of the Dutch owned enterprises.
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Judicial assumptions with regard to such a neglect was referred to the common
assumption that the power of the autonomous areas had consequently been lost by the
issuance of Law No. 1 of 1957 on the Principles of Local Governments. The article 2, verse 2
of Law reads: "Autonomous Regions according to the importance and the development of
today's society can be defined as a Special District level I, II or III or Autonomous Regions to
the level I, II or III, which is entitled to manage their own households." and in the
explanatory note, the article says:
“In addition, it needs to be explained herein that there is no differences in levels
among the areas of municipalities (swapraja) except that of the Capital City of the
state, which indeed carries its own position and history. The provision of this article
No. 2 stipulates that the area of municipalities by laws can be made into Special
District or even a Common District. It further means that the municipalities become
the areas that are granted by law with autonomous power, which is basically to have
been in compliance of the spirit of article No. 132 of the Provisional Law. In relation
to the Special District, each time any autonomous area is formed to be a Special
District or region, then it is basically we have given it a new status to the
autonomous area, which is the form of arrangement of its governance is held
according to article NO. 132 paragraph 1 of the Provisional Law, it shall be
adjusted to the provisions stipulated within article 131 of the Provisional Law. To
any autonomous, area an autonomous authority shall be given by law, so that any
autonomous area is not allowed to be free from practicing autonomous authority
democratically as mandated by the law, to which people the authority is granted
almost all of the autonomous power, except that of all related to customary dealings
that can be maintained in the hand of the autonomous district and its clients provided
that all the people remain abiding under the prevailing customary laws. In the event
that an Autonomous Areas is formed to be a Special District or a Common District,
then it carries within itself the removal of its status to be an autonomous area, and by
itself the changing status of its being an autonomous area shall then be made and
arranged differently, namely regarding the high-ranking officials and other common
officials of the areas, which to the most extent possible be appointed to be in the
formation of the officials of the Special District in accordance with related
requirements of needed skills and expertise, etc.”16

Whether or not will the removal/abolishment as stipulated within the Law No. 1 of
1957 by itself be annulling various relations of civil rights as already determined before?
How is it to treat the plantation concession between the previous Eastern Sumatera Sultanates
and the Dutch origin Entrepreneurs, which was already and obviously determined as
personal/individual rights (persoonlijk recht) – and instead not as material rights (zakelijk
recht) by earlier writers and the panel of judges in Bremen Court? Or, may the nationalization
automatically abolish or annul personal/private rights of any groups, which is obviously part
of its own nation?
In his dissertation, Robert van De Wall quoted that the plantation concession
constituted a private/personal right which was based on the agreement between the Sultanate
and the concession holders (de landbouw concessie is een persoonlijk recht, berustend op een
overeenkomst tussen de Sultan en de concessionaris). Still in the dissertation, some facts
were shown within the Sultanate of Deli, Serdang and of Langkat Sultanate there were found
about 5493 plantations and none of them was in the form of rights of erfpacth (that after the
period of 1960 – through the Basic Agrarian Law No. 5 of 1960 to be converted to be the
16
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rights of HGU) except that of what was from the beginning officially mentioned as a
concession agreement – as already and widely indicated in various written documents.
Therefore, it was clear that the conversion and or the shifting from concession rights to the
rights of HGU in context of the said nationalization was not having strong legal basis in
expropriating and stating the lands of the ex-concession to be under the ownership of the
government of Indonesia.17
In addition, as also affirmed within International Civic Law it was clearly known of
the principle “Lex rei sitae”. According to this principle what is created, removed/abolished
and transferred, in terms of rights over things or objects shall be governed by law from which
rights and places the objects are factually located. This principle of “lex situs” applies to both
moving and fixed objects. This “lex Situs” principle can also be used with regard to the
transfer of rights of objects, which is based on the nationalization. The country, in which
place the objects are located is the one who can determine whether or not a regulation on
nationalization is effectively done with regard to the transfer of rights to be the state owned.
Martin Wolff had clearly quoted this. This writer had further affirmed as long as the related
confiscation decree came in relation to any objects located within the territory of the state
conducting the confiscation, then it certain came up with the transfer of titles of rights
ownership to the related state and this will be respected everywhere and so as it is also related
to the objects being confiscated to be under the ownership of any foreign individuals and not
of the citizens of the state conducting the confiscation.18
Article No. 1 of Law No. 86 of 1958 on the Nationalization of the Dutch owned
Enterprises states: “ The Dutch owned enterprises factually located in the territory of
Republic of Indonesia that will be determined and regulated by Indonesian law shall be
affected by the nationalization and is officially claimed to be in the full and free ownership of
the state of Republic of Indonesia. Within the article 1 State Regulation No. 2 of 1959 on the
Principles of the Implementation of the Nationalization of the Dutch Owned Enterprises (LN
1959, No. 5), it was stipulated that the ones being affected by the nationalization are all
wealth and assets, either be moving or fixed assets and either be rights or liabilities or
receivables. These legal norms lead us to a conclusion that wealth/assets or anything relating
to the Dutch owned enterprises, but not of their wealth, such as concession lands and any
rights entitled to the rightful owners, namely the Sultanate of Deli and other smaller
sultanates, which was legally binding that time could not be nationalized to be under the
ownership of Republic Indonesia.
The Government of Indonesia seemed to have evenly equalized the qualities of
autonomous areas those of located in Java and those of located in Sumatera (most specifically
autonomous areas located along the eastern coast of North Sumatera. As a matter of facts, the
construct of the concession agreement between the Sultanates and the Dutch origin
entrepreneurs had never been found the same in any areas of Java Island. In other words, the
long terms contracts of plantations owned by the Dutch enterprises in Java island were made
on the basis of Material Rights more or less like erfpacht upon areas directly under the
authority of the Gubernemen and parties within the areas are only Gubernemen government
and other Dutch origin entrepreneurs – whilst the concessions made in the former Eastern
Sumatera were private and long terms contracts between two subjects or parties of the civil
law, namely the Sultanates and the Dutch origin entrepreneurs.
17
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IV. Conclusion
Such a prolonged economic crises and the failure of winning diplomatic struggles for
the West Irian had become strong legal basis for Soekarno to launch his debut for enacting
the nationalization of the Dutch owned enterprises in Indonesia by the end year of 1957. The
government seemed to have blinded his eyes when the so called nationalization was enforced
without considering the basis for legal relations as a means of resolution of conflict between
the Dutch owned enterprises and the entity of the Sultanates in eastern Sumatera.
This remains to be an eternal question whether leaders and law experts in Jakarta
really know that all lands used as major plantations in Eastern Sumatera, mainly in Deli,
Serdang and Langkat, are actually communal lands entitled to the Sultanates to tie themselves
into contracts with the Dutch owned plantation enterprises? Do they really understand that
the said contracts were of long terms leasing to be made on the basis of private rights? It was
clearly revealed that some essential and crucial matters were not put into proper account.
These are all very likely to take place due to the dissenting outlooks over the state
management sides upon the proclamation of 1945 and upon the enforcement of Law No. 1 of
195t on the Principles of Governance in the Regions to have been used as strong legal basis
for the annihilation of the Sultanate, Autonomous areas, vorstenlanden and the like.
As a matter of fact, in view of normative outlook, such an insight was baseless. The
elaborating paragraph of Law No. 1 of 1957 stipulated like the following:
“Due to the presence or absence of the units of indigenous community as a working
basis to develop the economic level, one has to be aware that the economic matters
are not congruent to the matters relating to customary law, where as when a unit of
indigenous people to be made into an autonomous area or is included into an
autonomous area, then it does not mean that the entities, rights and obligation of the
customary leaders are by itself abolished or removed. What likely to be abolished or
removed is only some characteristic of customary practices relating to self-governing
system, where as if only one unit of indigenous community to be made into an
autonomous area, then with the characteristic pointed out herein, shall be in
congruence with the power system as delineated in the understanding of the
autonomy. Capability to digest such a difference, namely the difference in autonomy
and customary power, will be of important basis to ensure the dynamic of the
autonomy itself to the very utmost satisfaction of the people, regardless of the facts of
their being so confined under the customary law system.”19

Whether or not the civic matters in context of the making of contract of plantation
concession between the two parties who agreed to get into the enforcement of agreement, for
any rightful objects then be interfered by the state – like the one stipulated within the legal
elaboration above – into the aspects of customary law of state-like governance? If right! It is
then true that the state, in this case through Sorkarno governance, has envisaged that those
lands being under the concessions to have been under the seizure of the state. As a matter of
facts, if it would only have been analyzed comprehensively, the said land-leasing deals
should have been part of private issues whatsoever. Further, the state itself knew that as long
as the said concessions were forced into effect, there had been no land and building tax to be
knowingly enforced or to be affected upon the lands of plantation concession. Thus, how
19
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would it be possible for the state to have claimed and seized the civil assets of an indigenous
group of people of the Deli Sultanate to be into the ownership of the state.
It would have been much naïve, in a later stage, in context of the lawsuits proposed by
the two of Dutch owned enterprises in the Bremen Court in Germany, as already elucidated
before, the government of Indonesia though his attorney making use of an argument, which
was very contrary to what was shown before the people of the Sultanate. Before the people of
the Sultanate, the state said that the concessions were constituting public related rights,
zakelijk recht, and of customary acts of government’s like interests. However, before the
Bremen Court, the Government of Indonesia argued that the disputed lands of the tobacco
concession belonged to the indigenous people and the legal relation between the Dutch own
enterprises and of the Sultanate was of private legal rights relation (persoonlijk).
It became obviously clear for us how the state through the Soekarno administration to
have used customary issues as a shield and as a way to defend the nationalization policies in
the one hand. However, domestically, communalism in the forms of customary land
occupation was blindly turned down without providing favorable options to the previous
owners. On the other hand, the use of term “nationalization” upon the land previously owned
by indigenous people has been of the contrary act out of the real meaning of the
nationalization itself. How could the nationalization term be attached to the lands originally
owned by indigenous people, which was used to serve in supporting the existing government?
Or has the state assumed that the Sultanate and its people were also foreigners and
consequently to have regarded proper to seize the assets they owned.
Law No. 86 of 1958 on the Nationalization of the Dutch owned Enterprises was of a
totally wrong policy that put evenly all legal constructs between the Dutch owned enterprises
and the people’s groups. Such an act would have been much proper if imposed upon
plantations in Java Island, because all plantations in Java were of the status of material right,
erfpacht. Instead, for the lands of Deli, Serdang and Langkat, the case was totally distinctive.
And, there had been no such material rights legal relation or erfpacht in the three areas
mentioned herein.
Through the enactment of this said law was actually the denials of communal land
rights owned by Melayu people to have commenced along the eastern coast of Sumatera. All
the sultanates mentioned earlier just did not put forward any reactions against the political
moves imposed by the ruling state. This has been much due to traumatic situation that had not
been fully subsided of a series of events taking place during the beginning years before
independence, namely social revolutions. The label of feudalism and becoming important
parts of the “Dutch Collaborator” had made them (the Sultanates) difficult to defend the lands
of ex-tobacco concession.
As a matter of facts, long before the nationalization occurred, the Sultan was also no
longer considered as the only institution that must be taken into account in the context of
contracts of the plantation. The state’s intervention, through the military with regard to the
affairs of securing the plantations after being abandoned by the Japan troops, indirectly
pushing out the role and function of the Sultanates over the contracts they had signed. The
peasant folks who became an important backbone of the legal alliance here no longer get the
protection and defense of the Sultanate. Furthermore, many of them have been accused of the
illegal occupation and criminalized by the law enforcement authorities.
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Out of the blue, all rules and regulations adopted by the relatively young state were
against the groups of people that had been many generations living, cultivating and plowing
the lands. These groups of the people had for many years been enjoying the communal rights
of their customary lands through either the mechanism of “Jaluran” cultivation system and
through other permits of land cultivation in accordance with local best practices. The social
chaos in the post of Japanese’s fall from allied forces had brought implication to the legal
disruption in context of matters relating to the lands of ex-tobacco concessions. The legal
construct was disrupted and the existing Dutch owned plantations had to strive to stay exist
by relying on the existing state institutions and law. The chaotic situation had forced the
military to do unnecessary intervention and this developed to be the threatening habits in later
stages covering the whole murkiness in the areas of plantations in eastern Sumatera or part of
North Sumatera in the present. All plantations in the name the State’s owned enterprises are
actually owned and managed for the sake of the people would then be at ease to use of the
help of the legal enforcers to fight back some groups of people trying to occupy and reuse the
lands of ex-tobacco concessions.
The Nationalization, Indonesianization, Confiscation or whatever it calls, in the end
would cause the annihilation of one original rights, which has for many years been enjoyed
by Melayu people. This is all due to the obscurity of legal facts and the history of land
confiscation as well as the stigmatization stabbing deep inside to the heart of the life of the
Sultanates and of the indigenous people as the groups of Dutch compradors and of the
feudalism that had thought of themselves – a stigma that around a decade before the
nationalization had ever been addressed to them and that of causing many of the common
Melayu people and the Royal Families got killed in Eastern Sumatera.20
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